ABSTRACT Decentralizing multi-authority attribute-based encryption (ABE) has been adopted for solving problems arising from sharing confidential corporate data in cloud computing. For decentralizing multiauthority ABE systems that do not rely on a central authority, collusion resistance can be achieved using a global identifier. Therefore, identity needs to be managed globally, which results in the crucial problems of privacy and security. A scheme is developed that does not use a central authority to manage users and keys, and only simple trust relations need to be formed by sharing the public key between each attribute authority (AA). User identities are unique by combining a user's identity with the identity of the AA where the user is located. Once a key request needs to be made to an authority outside the domain, the request needs to be performed by the authority in the current domain rather than by the users, so, user identities remain private to the AA outside the domain, which will enhance privacy and security. In addition, the key issuing protocol between AA is simple as the result of the trust relationship of AA. Moreover, extensibility for authorities is also supported by the scheme presented in this paper. The scheme is based on composite order bilinear groups. A proof of security is presented that uses the dual system encryption methodology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing enables users to store their sensitive data into untrusted remotely cloud service providers to achieve scalable services on-demand. Prominent security requirements arising from this means of data storage and management include data security and privacy and require the use of strong encryption techniques with fine-grained access control for data security in cloud computing. Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) is an efficient encryption system with fine-grained access control for encrypting out-sourced data in cloud computing. With the emergence of sharing confidential corporate data on cloud servers, data are generated by several organizations, and access policies can be defined by several authorities. Single-authority ABE cannot meet the demands of decentralized distribution, and decentralizing multi-authority ABE have been proposed to solve those problems.
For basic Identity-based encryption (IBE) and ABE, all private keys are managed by an authorized centre. However, in practice, this will present a performance bottle-neck requiring evaluation due to the huge numbers of requests. In addition, concentrated attacks seem to be more easily from happening. Therefore, Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) [1] - [7] and Hierarchical ABE (HABE) [8] - [11] are now being used. HIBE and HABE are also called levelled multi-authority IBE and ABE. According to the main concept, the authorized centre is managed at different levels, and domains or users at higher levels can use their private keys to generate private keys for the domain or users at lower levels. HIBE or HABE, when applied at various levels, can solve the key distribution load problem. Because roots are ultimately trusted sources, authorized centres at each level are based on a single trusted root. In addition, system efficiency can be improved dynamically because identity authentication and key transmission can be performed locally.
In basic ABE systems, the information shared is always within one domain or organization. However, in reality, information such as drivers' licenses and registration information in universities are organized by different government departments. The management of attributes and key distributions cannot be undertaken by the same attribute authority. Moreover, access strategies may be distributed based on attributes of different authorities. Therefore, levelled multiauthority ABE cannot meet distribution demands. Decentralizing multi-authority ABE is used to solve the access problem in which user attributes belong to different authorities. Those authorities differ from that for a levelled multiauthorized ABE, for which the levelled multi-authority ABE has one trust root. There is no trust between organizations, and attribute management and key distribution always are performed separately from each other. For some specified work reasons such as sharing confidential corporate data on cloud servers, trust relationships can be made between organizations.
Single-authority ABE primarily randomizes private keys, and the secret values are separated based on the part in the users' private keys (referring to a different attribute), and decryption is performed by reconstructing the secret values. In Single-authority ABE, each user's keys are generated using different random and secretly shared values such that keys generated for different users cannot be combined, which prevents collusion attacks.
For decentralizing multi-authority ABE, the private keys of users can be generated by different authorities that do not communicate. Thus, the crucial technical challenge for decentralizing multi-authority ABE is constructing a secretsharing value to resist collusion attacks. The Global Identifier (GID) and central authority originated to solve the resist collusion attacks. All early schemes used central authority to deliver secret splitting, thereby assuring collusion resistant under circumstances wherein authorities do not trust one another. However, a central authority should be globally trustworthy. Therefore, in order to avoid the security weaknesses resulting from the use of central authorities, schemes that do not employ central authorities have been published. There is no reliance on single trust centres, and although each authority distributes its own attributes and keys, they still need common support parameters for distribution by related organizations, or complicated trust relationships need to be formed between each authority. User's GID is published globally in early schemes will breach the user privacy. In order to solve the question, some schemes used anonymous key issuing protocol to enhance user privacy, but the protocols usually are complex.
OUR CONTRIBUTION: Our scheme is a decentralized multi-authority ABE that will dynamically enhance privacy and security. A central authority is not relied on to manage users and keys. Our scheme offers some improvements by combining a user's identity with the identity of the Attribute Authority (AA) where the user is located. This leads to unique user identifiers globally, and the problem of collusion resistance is also solved. In addition, user identity management does not require support from a new management organization. In our scheme, when the user requests an attribute secret key, if the attributes are located outside the domain, the request by the source AA in the domain to the target AA is used rather than by requests by users themselves. So, user identities remain private to the AAs outside the domain, thus avoiding privacy disclosure. The key issuing protocol between AAs is simple as result of the trust relationship of AAs. On the other hand, using the AA instead of users to initialize attribute requests can greatly improve efficiency and security. In addition, some simple parameter exchanges only occur at the very early stage of the construction of each attribute authority. The trust relationship can also only be made by sharing the public key between each AA. User management and key distribution are conducted by the AA within the domain, and, therefore, the dynamic joining of AA is supported in our scheme. Dual system encryption has been used to test the security of our scheme.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW A. LINEAR SECRET-SHARING SCHEMES
Definition 1 [12] : Assume P = {P 1 , P 2 . . . , P n } is a set of parties. The secret sharing scheme over P is called a Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme (LSSS) only if the requirements described below are met.
(1) The shares for each set of P form a vector over Z p .
(2) There exists a share-generating matrix A for , where A is a matrix with l rows and n columns, and (A, ρ) represents an access structure A, For all i = 1, . . . , l, ρ is a mapping from {1, . . . , l} to P such that the i th line of matrix A is mapped to one participant, P i . s is the secret sharing value, and v 2 , v 3 , . . . v n are the n−1 values randomly picked from Z p that form a vector υ = (s, v 2 , v 3 , . . . v n ) with n dimensions; therefore, A · υ = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , . . . c n ) is the vector of n shares of secret s. Assuming A i is the representative vector of the i th line over matrix A, then c i = A i · v can be recognized as the secret sharing value of participant ρ(i).
For linear secret reconstruction, assume is a LSSS for accessing structure A, S is an authorized set and S ∈ A. Define I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S}. If the vector {1, 0 . . . , 0} is in the span of rows of A indexed by I and there exists a constant {ω i ∈ Z p } i∈I , according to , i∈I ω i c i = s can therefore be obtained. For unauthorized sets, such constants do not exist.
B. COMPOSITE ORDER BILINEAR GROUPS
Definition 2 [13] : Assume N = p 1 p 2 p 3 (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are prime numbers that differ from each other), G and G T are cyclic groups of order N , and let g denote a generator of G.e : G × G → G T is then a composite order bilinear map with the following properties:
(
We let G p i denote the subgroups of order p i in G, ∀h i ∈ G p i and ∀h j ∈ G p j and if i = j, then e(h i, h j ) = 1
III. RELATED WORK
Research on decentralizing multi-authority ABE can be distributed into two groups that are referred to as central authority and non-central authority. The most popular central authority schemes include Chase07 and Müller-Katzenbeisser, and Lewko-Waters, Chase09 and Lin-Cao are representative non-central authority schemes.
A. CHASE07 SCHEME For the Chase07 scheme [14] , Chase illustrated a method that allows multi-independent attribute authorities to manage attributes and distribute keys. A message is encrypted such that a user can only decrypt it if he has at least d k of the given attributes from each authority k and those attributes belong to different authorities. The Global Identifier (GID) and central authority originated in the Chase07 scheme to solve the decentralizing multi-authority ABE collusion resistant problem. A trustable central authority can ensure correct secret splitting among different authorities, which leads to collusion resistant. Moreover, trustable relationships do not need to be made between each authority. Each user only has the request attributes offered by all authorities; therefore, the entire secret value can be obtained, and the cipher text can be decrypted. This was the first presentation of the idea of using GID binding with users' private keys, and the user tends to be unique globally. The disadvantages of the Chase07 scheme can be summarized by the following three points. First, the central authority needs to be trustable under all circumstances. Second, there is a stable access policy whereby each user needs to be offered a constant number of the attributes that are authorized by the authority. Third, the extensibility is weak, and once an authority needs to be added, the keys need to be replaced throughout the entire network. Lastly, users need to submit their own GID information to each authority will cause privacy disclosure.
B. MÜLLER-KATZENBEISSER SCHEME
Müller et al. [15] offered a different system with a centralized authority that realizes any LSSS access structure in the Müller-Katzenbeisser scheme. Unlike the Chase07 scheme, the central authority here is mainly used to generate the public and private keys for each user and bind those keys to the identities of the users. For decryption, private keys and secret attribute keys are needed. A user's private key is generated by a central authority that is unique within the network, which ensures that the attributes are related to the same user. Thus, the full process of decryption can be performed. In addition, the collusion resistance problem can be solved for each user, who applies a different relative secret attribute key from the authority. The bilinear pairings are used to achieve a Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) access policy such as ((a 1 a 2 ) a 3 ) in the Müller-Katzenbeisser scheme, and the complex access policy that cannot be solved using Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) is easily solved in this scheme. In the Müller-Katzenbeisser scheme, each attribute authority does not need to build the trustable relationship, and the extensibility, which refers to the flexibility for adding new users or attribute authorities at any time, is great. Two disadvantages can be summarized. First, the access policies need to be presented in the DNF. Second, complex access policies cannot be fully supported.
C. LEWKOWATERS SCHEME Lewko and Waters [16] demonstrated a decentralizing multiauthority ABE method that does not solely rely on the central authority of the Lewko-Waters scheme. The secret value segmentation for attributes required by access policy can be achieved using the computational Monotone Boolean Formulas and Monotone Span Programs to construct linear secretsharing schemes. For decryption, the required attributes should conform for the same user. The system uses the GID to bind the different attributes together for the assigned user, and collusion attack therefore cannot be undertaken by separate users based on their own attributes. The Lewko-Waters scheme has already removed the central authority, which also avoids performance bottlenecks and trust problems brought about by a central authority. These can be counted as crucial improvements to efficiency and safety. Each authority works completely separately, and failures or disruptions for some authorities will not affect other authorities, which makes the system much stronger. Apart from the initial set of public parameters that are built by all authorities, authorities no longer need to be build trustable relationships between each other in advance. In addition, policy depictions based on access trees allow more complex access policies to be depicted for support. Although the Lewko-Waters scheme does not need a central authority but rather the uniqueness of the user due to the GID, in order to maintain the reality of the GID, each authority needs to be supported by the GID organization that manages the users' identities, and the GID is published globally will breach the user privacy.
D. OTHER SCHEMES
Lin08 is a scheme based on thresholds with non-central authorities, as illustrated by Lin et al. [17] . The weakness of the scheme is that the set of authorities is fixed beforehand, and they must interact through complex protocols during the system setup. Collusion resistance requires that the number of users does not exceed a system parameter that is chosen at setup such that operational cost and key storage scale with the parameter. In addition, user's GID is also published globally.
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Chase et al. [18] presented their Chase09 scheme, which does not use a central authority. The Chase09 scheme follows the Chase07 scheme for secret segmentation and does not use a central authority for reconstructing secret values, but it is complicated to negotiate key parameters and build trustable relationships between authorities. The Chase09 scheme designs the anonymous key issuing protocol without revealing any information about that GID to the authority, but the protocol is also complex.
Rahulamathavan et al. [19] illustrated a decentralized multi-authority ABE with non-central authority in Rahulamathavan-Veluru scheme. Rahulamathavan-Veluru scheme exploited the anonymous key issuing protocol of Chase09 scheme to strengthen the bind between decryption keys and GID as well as to preserve the user privacy. The disadvantage of the scheme is that the protocol still needs to interact many times and multiple key parameters need to be set up.
IV. MODEL DEFINITION
A. SCHEME MODEL In cloud computing, systems are developed by information safety cooperation and university and safety association, and the data that are generated are encrypted and then stored by cloud services. The data are generated by several authorities, and the data access policy can be defined as follows: (((developer at cooperation A) OR (lecturer at university B)) AND (member of safety association C)). As the system develops, the access policy may be changed constantly due to data issues, which may require attributes from one authority or various authorities. Assuming cooperation, universities and safety associations are separate administer domains, and due to the collaborative work, a trust domain is constructed by those parties. In this article, an administer domain is defined as a single authority. A trust domain is contributed by multiple administer domains, and because information is securely exchanged between the domains, cooperative work and resource sharing can be achieved. The scheme model described in this article is shown Figure 1 . The core of the scheme model is administer domain, and each administer domain contains one or more Attribute Authorities.
Attribute Authority (AA): Each domain AA administers its own users and attributes, generates the attribute public keys, and distributes the user attribute secret keys to users. Each AA contains its own public keys and secret keys; the public keys are used as the authentications between different AAs, and the secret keys are used to generate the public keys of the attributes and the user attribute secret keys.
Users: The users for each domain are severed by their own authority, and the GID of a user is formed by the combination of the AA identity and user identity inside domain (ID AA ID u ). Therefore, a user's GID can be assumed to be unique throughout the entire trust domain. The identifier can properly solve the collusion resistance problem, and, in addition, user identity management does not need to be offered by a specific organization. Attribute: An attribute identifier consists of an AA identity and an attribute identity inside a domain (ID AA ID A ). Thus, each attribute identifier is unique throughout the entire trust domain. Each attribute has a public key, and the key is distributed by each AA and used to encrypt a message.
UserAttributeKey: User attribute secret keys bind the user's attributes and identities together and are used for decryption and to verify attributes distributed to users. For collusion resistant issues, each user requires a different user attribute secret key.
B. FLOW OF ATTRIBUTE AUTHORIZATION
The attributes distributed to a user might belong to different AAs, but those AAs are based on the same trust domain. The AA for each administer domain can distribute user attribute secret keys for the users within and outside the domain. Because the AA for each administer domain knows the privilege of the users clearly, the user privileges in the administer domain are managed by the AA within the domain. The keys distributed to users outside the domain are based on the domain-to-domain AA.
The detailed process is listed below.
(1) Once a user asks for an attribute outside the domain, the request should be made initially to the AA within its own domain.
(2) A request to the target domain depends on the legality of the application, which has been made within its own domain.
(3) Once a request is accepted by an AA for a target domain, it is decided whether the AA is from the same trust domain. If the answer is yes, then the legalities of the attribute requests from users are checked, and user attribute secret keys are generated. Otherwise, the requests will be declined.
(4) Once the requested AA receives the user attribute secret key from target AA, the key will be forwarded to the user, and the user can then make the relative access.
The public keys of attribute are distributed by the AA within the domain. The key distribution and the above process are illustrated in Figure 2 . The detailed key distribution process of domain-to-domain AA is showed in Key issuing protocol of part C of V in this paper. 
C. SCHEME DEFINITION
The scheme presented in this essay is mainly implemented using the following six algorithms.
(1)Global Setup: The Global Setup algorithm produces the global parameters (GP) between the AAs.
(2)Authority Setup: Each AA runs the Authority Setup algorithm with the GP and AA identity as inputs to generate its own public key and secret key pair. Once the trust relationships need to be made between each AA, the public keys of the AAs will be swapped.
(3)RequestAttributePK: For the attributes of each domain, the RequestAttributePK algorithm is executed by the AA to generate the public key of attribute for message encryption.
(4)KeyGenUserAttribute: The KeyGenUserAttribute algorithm produces the user attribute secret key using an AA. The algorithm can be divided into two key request algorithms: in-domain and outside domain. Once the user applies the attribute in the domain, the AA in that domain will generate a user attribute secret key according to the GID of the user. If the user is applying the attribute outside the domain, the AA for the current domain will initiate the request to the target domain for the user, using the H 2 (GID) value to generate the user attribute secret keys. Finally, the user attribute secret keys are bound with the user GID.
(5)Encrypt: The encryption algorithm uses the input message M , GP, access n × l matrix A and related public keys of attributes for the access matrix to output cipher-text (CT).
(6) Decrypt: The decryption algorithm inputs the CT, GP, and user attribute secret key set for one user. Once the user has attributes that meet the requirements of the access matrix, decryption can be performed.
D. SECURITY DEFINITION
We define a game between a challenger and an attacker on security of the model illustrated in this essay. S denotes the set of authorities, and it is assumed that the attacker can obtain public keys of corrupt authorities. The challenger plays the role of the AAs.
(1) Setup: By running the Global Setup algorithm, the attacker can specify a set S ⊆ S of corrupt authorities. For non-corrupt authorities, the challenger runs the RequestAttributePK algorithm, which sends the public keys of attributes to the attacker.
(2) Key Query Phase1: The attacker initializes a request for a user attribute secret key by submitting pairs (i, GID) to the challenger, where i is an attribute belonging to a good authority. The challenger responds by providing the relative key SK i,u . The attacker cannot request the key set in this fashion, which can be used for decryption when combined with the keys of the corrupt AAs. In addition, the request GID of the attacker cannot belong to the corrupt AAs.
(3) Challenge Phase: The attacker specifies two messages, M 0 and M 1 , and an access matrix (A, ρ) for the challenger. The challenger flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1} and sends an encryption of M β under the access matrix (A, ρ) to the attacker.
(4) Key Query Phase2: Identical to that for Key Query Phase1, the attacker may submit key queries continuously.
(5) Guess: The attacker will submit a guess β for β. If β = β , the attacker's advantage in this game is defined to be Pr
Definition 3(Security Definition):
A decentralized multiauthority ABE system is secure, only if the game mentioned above, and any polynomial time attackers have, at most, a negligible advantage, which can be ignored.
V. SCHEME CONSTRUCTION A. BASIC CONCEPT
The core technique of the decentralizing multi-authority ABE is collusion resistant; the users' keys need to be separated in multiple authorities. For the Chase07 scheme, the secret value is sliced into private keys that are suitable for the user, and the decryption can be achieved by reconstructing the secret values of each domain and globally. This methodology of secret slicing is suitable for situations of simple access policies when attribute authorities are relatively stable. For the Lewko-Waters scheme, a secret value is sliced in the different attributes of the access policy, the access policy does not need to be considered during key distribution, and the secret share is located in the access policy of the cipher-text. Thus, Lewko-Waters scheme becomes flexible and can be changed in relation to data demands.
For the scheme in this essay, the secret slicing methodology of the Lewko-Waters scheme is used as a reference to build a flexible access policy. Although the Lewko-Waters scheme does not use a central authority, it still relies on the user identity management offered by a relevant management centre to ensure that users' identities are globally unique. Once a user's identity is published globally, privacy and security issues appear to some extent; a user outside the domain requests a key from the AA directly, which will lead to issues of security and reliability for the user. In addition, working capacity will be increased dynamically. Users also need to submit their own GID to each authority, and therefore the authorities can obtain complete information on users according to their GIDs, which might affect their own privacies once the GIDs are used to recover the user's information.
User identities in our scheme are globally unique, and, in addition, user identity management support does not need to be offered by related organizations. For privacy and security requirements, identity management and use all occur inside domains, and user identities will not be published globally. Requests for keys outside a domain are performed by an attribute authority rather than by user requests. For that reason, the number of key applications from outside the domain will decrease sharply, and the probability of users who cheat also decreases. Public key of attribute do not require that each attribute have a pair of random numbers; only the public and secret keys of the AA are required, which make the algorithm simpler, and the complexity of the system is reduced while operating. In addition, some simple parameter exchanges only occur at the very early stage of the construction of each attribute authority. 1 . In addition, a finite set of hash functions needs to be defined, and hash functions are uniformly and randomly chosen from the set H x a : {0, 1} * → Z N . The index of a hash function is used as the secret key of the AA. In addition, our scheme is similar to that of ABE, which uses composite-order bilinear groups. Although the scheme is based on composite-order bilinear groups, the system is entirely limited within subgroup G p 1 in G. Subgroups G p 2 and G p 3 are only used in the security proof and for constructing semi-functional keys and semifunctional cipher-texts, which will not be used in the operational scheme practically.
(1) GlobalSetup(λ) → GP: Input the security parameter λ, generating the global parameter GP. A bilinear group G of order N is chosen. GP are N and a generator g 1 of G p 1 . The random oracle functions H 1 and H 2 are also included.
(2) Authority Setup (GP, a ) → PK a , SK a : Input GP and the AA identity, and each AA chooses a random exponent s a ∈ Z N . In addition, a hash function H x a : {0,1} * → Z N is uniformly and randomly chosen from a finite set of hash functions. The index of the hash function in the function set keeps the secret key of the AA. Therefore, the secret key of AA can be represented as SK a = s a , x a , ∀a, and the public key is expressed as PK a = g , ∀a , where the identity of the attribute authority a is ID AA .
(3) RequestAttributePK(GP, ID i , SK a )→ PK i : The public key of attribute is generated by AA which according to the GP, attribute identifier, and the secret key of AA. Where,
and
Attribute identifier ID i consists of the AA identity and the attribute identity inside the domain. ID AA represents the AA identity, which the user locates. ID A represents the attribute identity inside the current domain. The attribute identifier is unique within the entire trust domain; therefore, the public key of each attribute can also be considered to be unique within the entire trust domain. In addition, the public key of attribute is generated by the AA's secret key, which will also ensure the reliability of the public key.
The algorithm is used to generate the user attribute secret key by AA according to the user's GID, attribute identifier, AA identity, GP and secret keys of the AA inside the domain.
GID is the global identifier of the user and consists of the AA identity and user identity inside the domain. ID u is the user identity within the domain. GID is unique throughout the entire trust domain, which also ensures that each user has a different user attribute secret key. ID i is the attribute identity, for which the user must apply. If the user is applying for the attribute inside the domain, the AA in the domain first checks whether the attribute belongs to the current AA. In the following, the user identity needs to be checked. Subsequently, the user attribute secret key, SK i,u , will be generated.
The algorithm is used to generate the user attribute secret key by an AA outside the domain. If the requested attributes by the user is outside the domain, the AA of the current domain will initiate the request to the target AA, the request information includes H 2 (GID) instead of GID for issues of privacy. The target domain will check the identity of the current AA, and once it is shown to be trusted, the user attribute secret keys will be generated. When the current AA obtains the keys, it will check the validity of the keys using the public keys of the requested attributes. The detailed process is described in the Key issuing protocol of part C of V.
(6) Encrypt(M (A, ρ), GP, {PK}) −→ CT: The encrypted algorithm inputs message M , GP, and a n × l access matrix A. ρ maps the row of matrix A to the attributes, and the relative public keys are requested by the access matrix. A random s ∈ Z N is picked, and a random vector ν ∈ Z l N is picked that has s as its first entry. Let λ x = A x · υ, where A x is the row x of the access matrix A. Another random vector ω ∈ Z l N that has 0 as its first entry is picked. Let ω x = A x · ω. A random r x ∈ Z N will be picked for A x located in each row of the access matrix A. The calculations are conducted according to
, and
The decryption algorithm inputs cipher-text CT, GP, and the user attribute secret key set for one user. Decryption will occur once the user has the requested user attribute secret keys that satisfied the access matrix during the encryption.
Assume the cipher-text is encrypted under the access matrix (A, ρ). To decrypt the message, H 2 (GID) and H 2 (ID AA ) can be computed according to the random function, where ID AA is the AA's identity at the user's location. If the user has the user attribute secret keys SK ρ (x) ,u for a subset of rows A x of A such that (1, 0, . . . 0) is in the span of those rows, then for each x, the following calculation is made:
(λ x = A x · υ and ω x = A x · ω where υ · (1, 0, . . . 0) = s and ω · (1, 0, . . . 0) = 0). The message therefore can be obtained: g 1 ) s . If the user with the same GID and ID AA satisfies the access tree, e(H 2 (GID) , g 1 ) and e(H 2 (ID AA ) , g 1 ) can be cancelled. In addition, as a matter of security, ID AA is verified to ensure that the target AA that distributed the key to the user outside the domain can only receive the H 2 (GID) value. This can also prevent collusion when the attributes belong to different AAs.
C. KEY ISSUING PROTOCOL
Our scheme divides the generation of the user attribute secret key into two categories to solve the privacy problem of user's GID is published globally. If the user is applying for the attribute inside the domain, the AA in that domain will generate a user attribute secret key according to the GID of the user. If the attribute that the user requests is outside the domain, the request by the source AA in the domain to the target AA is used rather than by requests by users themselves. So, user identities remain private to the AAs outside the domain, thus avoiding privacy disclosure. As shown in Figure 3 , the detailed process is listed below.
(1) If the current AA 1 requests the user attribute secret key for target AA 2 , the information that is submitted should include H 2 (GID) , ID i and ID AA 1 . H 2 (GID) replaces GID for issues of privacy by not publishing the user identity and construction within the domain. 
D. SECURITY 1) BASIC CONCEPT
The proof of the security of our scheme is based on the dual system encryption from Waters [6] . In a dual system, keys and cipher-texts have two formats: normal and semifunctional. The normal key can be used to decrypt the normal cipher-text and the semi-functional cipher-text. However, the semi-functional key only can be used to decrypt the normal cipher-text and is not suitable for semi-functional cipher-text. However, a crucial problem for dual system encryption is to ensure that game k and game k-1 are hard to distinguish. The simulator can perform a test to determine whether the key is a semi-functional key by using the key to decrypt the semi-functional cipher-text that belongs to the same identity. Therefore, the dual system encryption requires the simulator and attacker cannot judge whether the key is semi-functional via testing. Lewko and Waters [7] presented a method to solve the problem mentioned above by using a nominally semifunctional key or cipher-text. In the attack game, although the simulator can convert the k th key to the semi-functional key, only one nominally semi-functional key can be constructed, and that key can be used to decrypt the semi-functional cipher-text. Therefore, that key cannot be distinguished from a normal key.
According to the theory illustrated in Lewko and Waters [7] , Lewko et al. [20] used the orthogonality of Composite Order Bilinear Groups to develop other types of nominally semi-functional cipher-texts and semi-functional keys. For Type 1 semi-functional cipher-text and semi-functional keys, a random value z i is defined by one attribute. One attacker could not use the Type 1 semi-functional key to decrypt the challenge cipher-text, and the only information that he can obtain theoretically should be the relative information of value z i , which is still quite limited. However, if the attribute has been used many times, the majority of the z i value can also be obtained by the attacker. Therefore, no more than one semi-functional key of Type 1 is used in the security game, and the remaining semi-functional keys are all of Type 2, which can avoid the potential hazard of revealing the value of z i . This is also defined in the security game.
The Lewko-Waters scheme [14] also uses the method of nominally semi-functional cipher-text and semi-functional keys. However, two semi-functional subgroups have been introduced to support the multi-authority and the subgroups differ from semi-functional subgroups in the Lewko scheme [20] . However, a problem remains in Lewko-Waters scheme, whereby a large number of random values will be revealed once the attacker frequently uses the Type 2 semifunctional key, because the random value in each subgroup is the core parameter of each user attribute secret key. Therefore, in our scheme, Type 2 semi-functional keys were redesigned, not only to retain their functionality but also so that the core parameters of the user attribute secret key will no longer be contained in a Type 2 semi-functional key.
2) COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
Four complexity assumptions will be illustrated in the proof of the security of our scheme. G and G T are bilinear groups of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , and e represents a bilinear map on G × G → G T . Assumptions 1-3 refer to assumptions 1-3 from the Lewko-Waters scheme. Assumption 4 is based on assumption 3 in the Lewko scheme [20] , which simplifies the proof of lemma 4. The progress of the proof for the given assumptions is shown in discussions of the Lewko-Waters [14] and Lewko schemes [20] . e(g 1 , g 1 ) ab . Random generator T 2 is picked from G T . The assumption is true if no algorithm exists that can distinguish T 1 and T 2 in polynomial time.
3) PROOF OF SECURITY

(Theorem 1 If Assumptions 1-4 hold, our scheme is secure):
The detailed process of the proof of Theorem 1 is discussed in the following. We need to define two additional structures: a semi-functional cipher-text and a semi-functional key. These will not be used in the real system but only in the proof. We will prove the security of our scheme from Assumptions 1-4 using a hybrid argument over a sequence of games.
First, every attribute i should have its own constant random values z i , t i ∈ Z N . These two random values are common to semi-functional cipher-text and keys. The values are bound with the attributes and will not change as users are changed. Our proof of security will also rely on a restriction whereby each attribute can only be used once in the row labelling of an access matrix.
Semi-functional Cipher-texts: To create normal ciphertexts C 0 , C 1,x , C 2,x , C 3,x and C 4,x ∀x, let g 2 and g 3 be the generators of G p 2 and G p 3 , respectively. Two random vectors u 1 , u 2 ∈ Z l N are chosen. For each row A x of the access matrix A, set δ x = A x · u 1 and σ x = A x · u 2 . B represents the subset of the marked relative rows of A, whose corresponding attributes come from the corrupted AAs.B represents the subset of the marked relative rows of A, whose corresponding attributes come from the good AAs. Two random exponents, α x and β x are picked. The semi-functional cipher-texts are formed as
Semi-functional keys of Type 1:
Semi-functional keys of Type 2:
Using the semi-functional keys of Type 1 to decrypt the semi-functional cipher-text, the quantitative e(g 2 , g 2 ) cδ x cannot be cancelled out. Therefore, the decryption cannot be made. While the secret shared value of δ x is 0, the cipher-text tends to be nominally a semi-functional cipher-text. Using the semi-functional keys of Type 2 to decrypt the semifunctional cipher-text, the quantitative e(g 3 , g 3 ) cσ x cannot be gotten rid of. Therefore, the decryption cannot be made either.
The games are defined as follows.
Game Real This game is the real security game, and the cipher-text and all the keys are normal.
Game 0 This is similar to Game Real , except that the challenge cipher-text will be semi-functional.
Game j,1 This is similar to Game 0 , expect that the first j − 1 received keys are semi-functional keys of Type 2, and the j th key is a semi-functional key of Type 1. The remaining keys are normal. Assuming q is the number of key queries made by the attacker, j ranges from 1 to q.
Game j,2 : This is similar to Game 0 , expect that the first j received keys are semi-functional keys of Type 2. The remaining keys are normal. Therefore, all keys in Game q,2 are all semi-functional keys of Type 2. In fact, Game 0,2 denotes another way of performing Game 0 .
Game Final : In this game, all the keys are semi-functional keys of Type 2. The cipher-text is a semi-functional encryption of a random message. The advantage of the attacker in this game is 0.
We will prove that these games are indistinguishable in the following four lemmas based on the four assumptions mentioned above. Game Real and Game 0 cannot be distinguished, and as a consequence, Game 0 equals Game 0,2 in fact; therefore, Game j−1,2 and Game j,1 cannot be distinguished, Game j,1 and Game j,2 cannot be distinguished, and Game q,2 and Game Final cannot be distinguished. Finally, the security of the scheme is proven.
Lemma 1: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm A such that Game Real Adv A − Game 0 Adv A = .
We can then construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage for breaking Assumption 1.
Proof: Setup: B receives N g 1 , and T from the challenger. Depend on the value of T , B will simulate either Game Real or Game 0 with A. B outputs g 1 as the generator of G p 1 which is the output group. N is the order of the group. A specifies the set S ⊆ S, where S is the set of all authorities, and S is the set of all corrupted authorities. For each attribute i of the good authorities, B chooses the random exponents q i , y i ∈ Z N and the public parameter PK is then sent to A.
A queries H 2 (GID) of the user identity and H 2 (ID AA ) of the AA identity where the user is located. B chooses random exponents h GID , h AA ∈ Z N , and sets
and H 2 (ID AA ) = g h AA 1 . Key query phase1: When A makes a key query of (i, GID), B generates the key according to the key generation algorithm based on random exponents q i and y i .
Challenge Phase: A sends messages M 0 and M 1 and the access matrix (A, ρ) to B. B tosses a random coin β ∈ {0, 1} and sends an encryption of M β based on access matrix (A, ρ) to A.
B chooses a random number s ∈ Z N . Set C 0 = M e (g 1 , g 1 ) s . B chooses two random vectors, v = (s, v 2 , . . . , v l ) and ω = (0, ω 2 , . . . , ω l ), where v 2 . . .v l and ω 2 , . . . , ω l are picked from Z N randomly. Set λ x = A x · υ and ω x = A x · ω.
The public parameters e(g 1 , g 1 ) q i and g y i 1 of attributes from corrupted authorities in access matrix (A, ρ) are supported from A to B. The definitions of sub-sets B andB refer to the definitions of the semi-functional cipher-texts.
If A x ∈ B, B chooses a random number r x ∈ Z N , and the cipher-text can be represented as
If A x ∈B, B chooses a random number r x ∈ Z N , where r x = rr x . The cipher-text then can be represented as
The G p 1 , G p 2 , and G p 3 parts of T are g r 1 , g c 2 , and g d 3 , respectively. Meanwhile, the random numbers r, c, and
The proof of Lemma 1 will be delivered via the following two aspects.
When T ∈ G p 1 , the cipher-text is normal, When T ∈ G, the cipher-text is semi-functional.
If T ∈ G p 1 , the G p 1 part of T is g r 1 , so the cipher-text is normal.
If T ∈ G, the G p 1 , G p 2 , and G p 3 parts of T are g r 1 , g c 2 and g d 3 , respectively.
When A x ∈ B, exponents δ x and σ x of g 2 and g 3 in C 4,x are δ x = A x · cω mod p 2 and σ x = A x · dω mod p 3 , respectively, and the cipher-text is therefore semi-functional.
When A x ∈B, according to the Remainder Theorem, r x modulo p 1 , r x modulo p 2 and r x modulo p 3 are uncorrelated, and rr x , cr x , and dr x are all random; thus C 2,x and C 3,x are semi-functional cipher-texts.
Exponents δ x and σ x of g 2 and g 3 in C 4,x are δ x = (A x · cω) mod p 2 and σ x = (A x ·dω) mod p 3 . y ρ (x) modulo p 2 refers to z ρ (x) in the semi-functional cipher-text, and y ρ (x) modulo p 3 refers to t ρ (x) in the semi-functional cipher-text. r x , y ρ (x) are randomly picked, and according to the Remainder Theorem, their values modulo p 1 , modulo p 2 , and modulo p 3 are uncorrelated. Therefore, the cipher-text is semi-functional because exponents α x , β x , z ρ (x) , and t ρ (x) of g 2 and g 3 are randomly distributed.
For semi-functional cipher-text, vectors u 1 and u 2 of δ x and σ x are random vectors. However, in this game, ω 1 in the vector ω is 0. Therefore, it is argued that ω 1 appears to be random in A's view.
For rows A x ∈ B, it belongs to an unauthorized set. For the matrix in the unauthorized set, although the distributed secret values are different, the secret sharing values are the same because of characteristics of the monotone span and the secret sharing [21] . Therefore, for A, we have ω = (0, ω 2 , . . . , ω l ) and ω = (k, ω 2 , . . . , ω l ). Although the distributed secret value is 0 or k, the secret sharing values are the same as M B • ω = M B • ω . Thus, from the adversary's perspective, it cannot be discerned whether ω 1 is 0 or k.
For rows A x ∈B, z ρ (x) in δ x + α x z ρ (x) is a random value. As long as a x modp 2 is not 0, it refers to the value of δ x in g 2 that can be explained by the value of z ρ (x) . Therefore, the secret sharing value is information-theoretically hidden, and the secret sharing values δ x are properly distributed in the attacker's view. The σ x in g 3 are also properly distributed for the same reason.
Thus, if T ∈ G p 1 , B has properly simulated Game Real . If T ∈ G, then B has properly simulated Game 0 .B can use A to attain advantage in breaking Assumption 1.
Lemma 2: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm A such that Game j−1,2 Adv A − Game j,1 Adv A = .
We can then construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage in breaking Assumption 2.
Proof:
Setup: The proof for lemma 2 is similar to the proof for lemma 1; the difference is that g 1 , g 3 , X 1 , X 2 and T are received by B from the challenger.
Key query phase 1: When A queries the key of (i, GID k ), B randomly picks exponents h GID k , h AA k ∈ Z N . Then, the generated key can be represented as SK i,u = g
where GID k denotes the k th identity of the queried by A.
When
h AA k where h GID k y i modulop 1 and h GID k y i modulop 3 are uncorrelated and where h AA k modulo p 1 and h AA k modulop 3 are uncorrelated as well. Therefore, the keys distributed by B are semi-functional keys of Type 2.
, and B distributes the normal keys. When A x ∈ B, B picks the random number r x ∈ Z N , and the cipher-texts are
. When A x ∈B, B chooses the random values ϕ x , r x ∈ Z N , where r x = rr x . The cipher-text is
. X 1 is g r 1 , and X 2 is g c 2 , where the random value c ∈ Z N . The proof of lemma 2 is the same as the proof of lemma 1 in those two aspects. When A x ∈ B or A x ∈B, the cipher-text distribution is semi-functional.
When A x ∈B, the secret sharing value of δ x for the exponent of g 2 is hidden to A, but the secret sharing value still needs to be set to 0. This ensures that the cipher-text generated by the simulator is a nominal semi-functional cipher-text. Thus, if simulator B performs a test to determine whether the j th key is a semi-functional or normal key by using the key to decrypt the nominal semi-functional cipher-text the key can decrypt the cipher-text. Therefore, that key cannot be distinguished from a normal key.
If T ∈ G p 1 , then B has properly simulated Game j−1,2 . If T ∈ G p 1 p 2 , then B has properly simulated Game j,1 .B can use A to attain advantage in breaking Assumption 2.
Lemma 3: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm A such that Game j,1 Adv A − Game j,2 Adv A = .
We then can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage in breaking Assumption 3.
Proof: Setup: The proof in this section is similar to the proof of lemma 2, the only difference being that B receives N , g 1 , X 1 , X 3 , Y 2 , Y 3 and T , which are sent from the challenger.
Key query phase 1 When A makes the (i, GID k ) key query, the key is generated by SK i,u = g
h AA k , identical to that for the proof of lemma 2, and the key distributed by B is a semi-functional key of Type 2.
, and the key distributed by B is a normal key.
When 
For each row A x , B chooses a random number r x ∈ Z N . When A x ∈ B, the cipher-texts are
When A x ∈B, the cipher-texts are C 1,x = e(g 1 , g 1 )
The proof is similar to that for lemma 2, and the distributed cipher-text is a semi-functional cipher-text. Challenge Phase B sets C 0 = M β T and s = ab. If T = e(g 1 , g 1 ) ab it can be said as the encryption to the message M β . If T is random, it can be said as the encryption is made to a random message.
For A x ∈B the cipher-text is determined as follows. B chooses random vectors v 1 and v 2 . The first element of v 1 is 1, the first element of v 2 is 0, and v 1 is orthogonal to all the rows in B (According to the complexity assumption, the vectors exist). The vectors are defined as
Because B cannot form the term e (g 1 , g 1 )
B chooses two vectors randomly; ω = (0, ω 2 , . . . , ω l ) and u = (u 1 , . . . , u l ), where ω 2 , . . . , ω l and u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u l are randomly picked from Z N , ω x = A x · ω and σ x = A x · u.B chooses a random number ϕ x ∈ Z N .
. The values of ϕ x modulo p 2 and ϕ x modulo p 3 are uncorrelated. Therefore, the distributed cipher-text is a suitable semifunctional cipher-text.
Because
. y ρ(x) modulo p 2 and modulo p 3 in C 4,x refer to the z ρ(x) and t ρ(x) in the semi-functional cipher-text, respectively. The values of y ρ(x) modulo p 1 , modulo p 2 and modulo p 3 are uncorrelated. The sharing vectors of sub-groups G p 2 and G p 3 are c 3 σ x and dσ x , respectively. The values of c 3 σ x modulo p 2 and dσ x modulo p 3 are all random. Therefore, this is a suitable semi-functional cipher-text for distribution.
For A x ∈ B, B picks a random r x ∈Z N . The definitions of random vectors v 1 , v 2 , ω, and u are same for 
. The values of σ x modulo p 2 and modulo p 3 are uncorrelated σ x is random as well and the cipher-text for distribution therefore is a semi-functional.
If s = ab, then T = e(g 1 , g 1 ) ab ; this is a semi-functional encryption of M β , and B has simulated Game q,2 . If T is random, this is a semi-functional encryption of a random message, and B has simulated Game Final .B can use A to obtain advantage in breaking Assumption 4.
In the final attack game in lemma 4, the challenger encrypts a random message, and the advantages for the attacker therefore can be ignored. If Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold, it has been proven that the real security game and Game Final cannot be distinguished. It has also been proven that the advantages for the attacker in a real security game can be ignored. Therefore, the scheme presented in this article can be considered to be secure, and the proof of Theorem 1 is complete.
E. COMPARISON OF SCHEMES
A detailed comparison among different decentralizing multiauthority ABE schemes without central authority is given in Table 1 . These schemes all use the GID. In decentralizing ABE, the cost of the ciphertext and key is mainly related to the attribute, so it is mainly compared with the attribute set. A u , A c and A k refer to the attribute set of a user, a ciphertext and authority k respectively. N refers to the number of authority, m refers to the maximum number of users supported in Lin-Cao scheme, | * | refers to the number of elements in the set, P refers to the invocation of two-party protocol (2PC). ''Ciphertext'' refers to the ciphertext overhead. ''Tolerance'' refers to the maximum damaged authorities or users against which a system remains secure. ''Key Issuing Protocol for Privacy'' refers to the number of the key protocol is called between the user and the AA. Trust relationships need to be formed between each authority in these schemes without central authority. ''Trust relationship'' refers to the number of invocations of the distributed parameters or key generation protocol required among the AAs in the setup stage.
Lin-Cao scheme needs to invocate m + 2 key distribution protocols to realize the key sharing among the AAs. Chase09 scheme requires the trust relationship to be established and the seed key to be generated between any two AAs. Lewko-Waters2011 and Rahulamathavan-Veluru schemes need to distribute the basic parameter information among the AAs in the setup stage. The GID is public globally in Lin-Cao and Lewko-Waters2011 schemes. Chase09 and Rahulamathavan-Veluru schemes all use the anonymous key issuing protocol to prevent privacy leaks. The anonymous protocol needs to generate new parameters, run 2PC protocols, generate the information needed by users and AA, and then interact with each other to produce the required key information. User identity management all need to be offered by related organizations in all above schemes without central authority.
In our scheme, each AA has public and secret keys, private key of attribute do not require, which reduce the quantity of key. Only when the system is set up, the public key of each AA and the basic parameters are distributed, which simplifies the process of trust establishment. The key issuing protocol for privacy, only need to use the public key of AA to realize the trust between AA, does not require support from the 2PC protocol, no new parameters need to be generated. In addition, users use the protocol only the requested attributes is outside the domain, so our scheme is more simple and efficient than Chase09 and Rahulamathavan-Veluru schemes. The GID management and use all occur inside domains, so there is no need for additional organizations to provide global management of GID.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Decentralizing multi-authority ABE can solve problems arising from security requirements of sharing confidential corporate data on cloud servers. For decentralized multi-authority ABE schemes with non-central authority, the collusion resistant can be solved using the GID. Therefore, the uniqueness of user identities needs to be managed globally, which results in crucial problems of privacy and security. In this essay, a scheme without a central authority to manage keys and users has been proposed, and privacy and security have been enhanced dynamically. (1) User identities tend to be unique globally to achieve collusion resistant, but identities need not be published globally. Privacy has been enhanced. Moreover, user identity management does not need to be offered by related organizations. (2) When a user requests a user attribute key from an attribute authority outside the domain, the current authority, not the user, performs the task. Efficiency is improved and user privacy is protected. In addition, the possibility of cheating suffered by users is also decreased. (3) To build trust relations, only global parameters and public key information need to be swapped between attribute authorities. (4) Each attribute authority manages its own keys and users, and the attribute authorities therefore can be flexibly expanded.
For future work, once the attribute authorities in each domain belong to a hierarchical multi-authority ABE, the focus must be on devising a method that combines the scheme designed in this essay with hierarchical multiauthority ABE.
